----------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright 1994 by the Christian Research Institute.
----------------------------------------------------------------
COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION LIMITATIONS:
This data file is the sole property of the Christian Research
Institute. It may not be altered or edited in any way. It may
be reproduced only in its entirety for circulation as "freeware,"
without charge. All reproductions of this data file must contain
the copyright notice (i.e., "Copyright 1994 by the Christian
Research Institute"). This data file may not be used without the
permission of the Christian Research Institute for resale or the
enhancement of any other product sold. This includes all of its
content with the exception of a few brief quotations not to
exceed more than 500 words.
If you desire to reproduce less than 500 words of this data file
for resale or the enhancement of any other product for resale,
please give the following source credit: Copyright 1994 by the
Christian Research Institute, P.O. Box 500-TC, San Juan
Capistrano, CA 92693.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
"Answering The Arguments For Abortion Rights. Part Four: When
Does a Human Become a Person?" (an article from the Christian
Research Journal, Summer 1991, page 28) by Francis J. Beckwith.
The Editor-in-Chief of the Christian Research Journal is
Elliot Miller.
-------------
In this final installment of my series on the arguments for
abortion rights, I will continue where I left off in the previous
article with a critique of some "decisive moment theories." In
addition, I will make some brief comments about the "gradualist"
thesis. I will conclude with responses to common questions about
the pro-life view that full humanness begins at conception.
*_DECISIVE MOMENT THEORIES (CONTINUED)_*
*_Beginning of Brain Development_*
Some bioethicists, such as Baruch Brody, believe that full
humanness begins when the brain starts functioning, which can
first be detected by the electroencephalogram (EEG) at about 40
to 43 days after conception.[1] (Although Brody has moral
problems with abortion on demand prior to brain functioning, this
is not because he believes the unborn is fully human.) Brody
maintains that in order to decide when something is fully human,
"we must first see...what properties are such that their loss
would mean the going out of existence (the death) of a human
being."[2] He concludes that since at brain death a human being
goes out of existence (at least in this mortal realm), the
presence of a functioning human brain is the property which makes
one fully human. Hence, it would only follow that the _start_ of
brain functioning is the _beginning_ of full humanness.
The fundamental difficulty with this argument "is that brain
death indicates the end of human life as we know it, the dead brain
having no capacity to revive itself. But the developing embryo has
the natural capacity to bring on the functioning of the brain."[3]
That is to say, an entity's _irreversible_ absence of brain waves
_after_ the brain waves have come into existence indicates that the
entity no longer has the natural, inherent capacity to function as
a human being, since our current technology is incapable of
"reactivating" the brain. However, the unborn entity who has yet to
reach the stage in (his or) her development at which brain waves
can be detected, unlike the brain dead individual, possesses the
inherent capacity to have brain waves. She is like a patient with
a _temporarily_ flat EEG. "The two stages of human life are, then,
entirely different from the point of view of brain functioning. The
embryo contains the natural capacity to develop all the human
activities: perceiving, reasoning, willing and relating to others.
Death means the end of natural growth, the cessation of these
abilities."[4]
Brody responds to this criticism by presenting the following
science-fiction case:
Imagine that medical technology has reached the stage at
which, when brain death occurs, the brain is removed,
"liquified," and "recast" into a new functioning brain.
The new brain bears no relation to the old one (it has
none of its memory traces, and so on). If the new brain
were put into the old body, would the same human being
exist or a new human being who made use of the body
of the old one? I am inclined to suppose the latter. But
consider the entity whose brain has died. Is he not like
the fetus? Both have the potential for developing into an
entity with a functioning brain (we shall call this a
weak potential) but we can conclude, it seems to me, that
an entity can go out of existence even if it retains a
weak potential for having a functioning brain, and that,
analogously, the fetus is not a human being just because
it has this weak potential. What is essential for being
human is the possession of the potential for human
activities that comes with having the structures required
for a functioning brain. It is this potential that the
fetus acquires at (or perhaps slightly before) the time
that its brain starts functioning, and it is this
potential that the newly conceived fetus does not
have.[5]
I do not believe that this response succeeds. First, unlike the
potential of the corpse's dead brain to be liquified and recast as
a new brain, the unborn's potency to develop is within itself
(_intrinsic_). "As in the case of other organisms," philosopher A.
Chadwick Ray points out, the unborn's development "admittedly
requires nourishment from outside and an appropriate environment
(consider parasites), but still, the fetus has within itself the
power to appropriate nourishment and grow." On the other hand, the
potential of Brody's corpse is utterly _extrinsic._ That is, "it
can be acted upon from the outside and brought to life, but without
immediate surgery its life will not be restored, and it will simply
rot."[6]
Second, the unborn has "interests of itself, in a
straightforward, non-projective way, that go beyond the interests
of its component parts __ cells, tissues, etc.," just as I as a
living organism have interests that go beyond the interests of my
component parts __ ears, nose, teeth, etc. On the other hand, the
corpse "has no interests beyond those of its parts. The component
cells may have an interest in continuing to live, but the corpse
itself has none." For example, "there would be no loss in the
corpse's organs, all being donated to different patients (imagine
donating every living cell if you prefer), whereas in a living
fetus's being chopped up for spare parts its _own_ interests would
be sacrificed."[7]
In summary, "the growth of the fetus is in its own interest and
is the realization of its intrinsic potential, in which realization
its identity is preserved." However, "the implanting of a new brain
into a brainless corpse would constitute the genesis of a new
organism with its own new _telos_ and interests where there were
none."[8] Therefore, since the prebrain-functioning unborn entity
has a natural inherent capacity for brain functioning while the
corpse does not, they do not have the same kind of weak potential
that Brody claims they have.
*_Viability_*
As I noted in Part Three, viability is the time at which the
unborn human can live outside her mother's womb. Some have argued
that prior to this time, since the unborn cannot survive
independent of her mother, she is not a completely independent
human life and hence not fully human.
Bioethicist Andrew Varga points out a number of problems with
the viability criterion. First, "how does viability transform _the
nature_ of the fetus so that the non-human being then turns into a
human being?" That is to say, viability is a measure of the
sophistication of our neonatal life-support systems. Humanity
remains the same, but viability changes. Viability measures medical
technology, not one's humanity.
Second, "is viability not just an extrinsic criterion imposed
upon the fetus by some members of society who simply declare that
the fetus will be accepted at that moment as a human being?"[9] In
other words, the viability criterion seems to be arbitrary and not
applicable to the question of whether the unborn is fully human,
since it relates more to the location and dependency of the unborn
than to any _essential_ change in her state of being. This
criterion only tells us when certain members of our society want to
_accept_ the humanity of the unborn.
And third, "the time of viability cannot be determined
precisely, and this fact would create great practical problems for
those who hold this opinion."[10] For example, in 1973, when the
Supreme Court legalized abortion, viability was at about
twenty-four weeks. But now babies have survived 20 weeks after
conception. This, of course, puts the pro-abortionist in a morally
difficult situation. For some health care facilities are killing
viable babies by abortion in one room while in another room
heroically trying to save premature infants (preemies). It seems
only logical that if the 21-week-old preemie is fully human, then
so is the 28-week-old unborn who can be legally killed by abortion.
This is why philosopher Jane English, who is a moderate on the
abortion issue (i.e., her position does not fit well into either
the pro-life or pro-choice camp, although she seems closer to the
latter), has asserted that "the similarity of a fetus to a baby is
very significant. A fetus one week before birth is so much like a
newborn baby in our psychological space that we cannot allow any
cavalier treatment of the former while expecting full sympathy and
nurturative support for the latter...An early horror story from New
York about nursers who were expected to alternate between caring
for six-month premature infants and disposing of viable 24-week
aborted fetuses is just that -- a horror story." English writes
that "these beings are so much alike that no one can be asked to
draw a distinction and treat them so differently."[11]
Many who defend the viability criterion argue in a circle.
Take, for example, Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun's use of it
in his dissenting opinion in _Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services_ (1989):
The viability line reflects the biological facts and
truths of fetal development; it marks the threshold
moment prior to which a fetus cannot survive separate
from the woman and cannot reasonably and objectively be
regarded as a subject of rights or interests distinct
from, or paramount to, those of the pregnant woman. At
the same time, the viability standard takes account of
the undeniable fact that as the fetus evolves into its
postnatal form, and as it loses its dependence on the
uterine environment, the State's interest in the fetus'
potential human life, and in fostering a regard for human
life in general, becomes compelling.[12]
Blackmun first tells us that viability is the time at which the
state has interest in protecting potential human life because the
fetus has no interests or rights prior to being able to survive
outside the womb. But then we are told that viability is the best
criterion because it "takes account of the undeniable fact that
as the fetus evolves...and loses its dependence on the uterine
environment, the State's interest in the fetus' potential human
life... becomes compelling." In other words, Blackmun is claiming
that the state only has an interest in protecting fetal life when
that life can live outside the womb. But why is this correct?
Because, we are told, prior to being able to live outside the womb
the fetus has no interests or rights. But this is clearly circular
reasoning, for Blackmun is _assuming_ (that the fetus has no
interests or rights prior to viability) what he is trying to
_prove_ (that the fetus has no interests or rights prior to
viability). This argument is no more compelling than the one given
by the political science professor who argues that democracy is the
best form of government _because_ the best form of government is
one run by the people (which, of course, is democracy). Such
arguments are circular because they provide no _independent_
reasons for their conclusions.
*_The Attainment of Sentience_*
Some ethicists argue that the unborn becomes fully human
sometime after brain development has begun, when it becomes
_sentient:_ capable of experiencing sensations such as pain. The
reason for choosing sentience as the criterion is that a being that
cannot experience anything (i.e., a presentient unborn entity)
cannot be harmed. Of course, if this position is correct, then the
unborn becomes fully human probably during the second trimester and
at least by the third trimester. Therefore, one does not violate
anyone's rights when one aborts a nonsentient unborn entity.[13]
There are several problems with this argument. First, it
confuses harm with hurt and the experience of harm with the reality
of harm.[14] One can be harmed without experiencing the hurt that
sometimes follows from that harm, and which we often mistake for
the harm itself. For example, a temporarily comatose person who is
suffocated to death "experiences no harm," but he is nevertheless
harmed. Hence, one does not have to _experience_ harm, which is
sometimes manifested in hurt, in order to be truly harmed.
Second, if sentience is the criterion of full humanness, then
the reversibly comatose, the momentarily unconscious, and the
sleeping would all have to be declared nonpersons. Like the
presentient unborn, these individuals are all at the moment
nonsentient though they have the natural inherent capacity to be
sentient. Yet to countenance their executions would be morally
reprehensible. Therefore, one cannot countenance the execution of
some unborn entities simply because they are not _currently_
sentient.
Someone may reply that while these objections make important
points, there is a problem of false analogy in the second
objection: the reversibly comatose, the momentarily unconscious,
and the sleeping _once functioned_ as sentient beings, though they
are now in a temporary state of nonsentience. The presentient
unborn, on the other hand, were _never_ sentient. Hence, one is
fully human if one was sentient "in the past" and will probably
become sentient again in the future, but this cannot be said of the
_pre_sentient unborn.
There are at least three problems with this response. First, to
claim that a person can be sentient, become nonsentient, and then
return to sentience is to assume there is some underlying personal
unity to this individual that enables us to say that the person who
has returned to sentience is the _same_ person who was sentient
prior to becoming nonsentient. But this would mean that sentience
is not a necessary condition for personhood. (Neither is it a
sufficient condition, for that matter, since nonhuman animals are
sentient.) Consequently, it does not make sense to say that a
person comes into existence when sentience arises, but it does make
sense to say that a fully human entity is a person who has the
natural inherent capacity to give rise to sentience. A presentient
unborn human entity _does_ have this capacity. Therefore, an
ordinary unborn human entity is a person, and hence, fully human.
Second, Ray points out that this attempt to exclude many of the
unborn from the class of the fully human is "_ad hoc_ and
counterintuitive." He asks us to "consider the treatment of
comatose patients. We would not discriminate against one merely for
rarely or never having been sentient in the past while another
otherwise comparable patient had been sentient....In such cases,
potential counts for everything."[15]
Third, why should sentience "in the past" be the decisive
factor in deciding whether an entity is fully human when the
presentient human being "is one with a _natural, inherent_ capacity
for performing personal acts?"[16] Since we have already seen that
one does not have to experience harm in order to be harmed, it
seems more consistent with our moral sensibilities to assert that
what makes it wrong to kill the reversibly comatose, the sleeping,
the momentarily unconscious, and the presentient unborn is that
they all possess the natural inherent capacity to perform personal
acts. And what makes it morally right to kill plants and to pull
the plug on the respirator-dependent brain dead, who were sentient
"in the past," is that their deaths cannot deprive them of their
natural inherent capacity to function as persons, since they do not
possess such a capacity.
*_Criteria of Personhood_*
Several ethicists, such as Michael Tooley,[17] Mary Anne
Warren,[18] James Rachels,[19] and Virginia Ramey Mollenkott,[20]
have put forth criteria that a being must fulfill in order to be
considered fully human. For some these criteria apply to any
entity, whether before or after birth. In fact, according to
Tooley, birth has no bearing on the moral status of the
newborn.[21]
Those who defend criteria for full humanness make a distinction
between "being a human" and "being a person." They argue that
although the unborn are part of the species _homo sapiens,_ and in
that sense are human, they are not truly persons since they fail to
fulfill a particular set of personhood criteria. Although the
defenders of personhood criteria do not agree on everything, their
underlying philosophical assumptions are similar enough that it is
safe to say that if I can show that these assumptions are
significantly flawed then no personhood criteria theory can succeed
in supporting the abortion-rights position. Since Mollenkott's view
is the most clear and succinct example, I will use her article as
my point of departure to critique the personhood criteria position.
Although much of my critique of this view can be found in my
criticisms of the other decisive moment and gradualist theories,
its underlying philosophical assumptions, which are oftentimes not
addressed by the proponents of this view, are deserving of a
separate critique.
In order to fully grasp Mollenkott's position, let me quote her
at length:
Kay Coles James of the National Right to Life Committee
claimed that fetal personhood is a biological fact rather
than a theological perception. But in all truthfulness,
the most that biology can claim is that the fetus is
genetically human.... The issue of _personhood_ is one
that must be addressed through religious reasoning.
Hence, the Lutheran Church in America makes "a
qualitative distinction" between the claims of the fetus
and "the rights of a responsible person made in God's
image who is in living relationships with God and other
human beings." Except in the most materialistic of
philosophies, human _personhood_ has a great deal to do
with feelings, awareness, and interactive experience.[22]
Mollenkott's argument can be put in the following
argument-outline:
(Premise 1) A person can be defined as a living being with
feelings, awareness, and interactive experience. (I assume she
means some sort of consciousness.)
(Premise 2) An unborn entity does not possess the
characteristics of a person as defined in Premise 1.
(Intermediate Conclusion) Therefore, an unborn entity does not
possess personhood.
(Final Conclusion) Therefore, killing an unborn entity is not
seriously wrong.
Others, such as Tooley and Warren, give more elaborate criteria
of human personhood. For instance, Tooley claims that a being
"cannot have a right to continued existence unless he possesses the
concept of a subject of experiences, the concept of a temporal
order, and the concept of identity of things over time." And since
"the concept of a right is such that an individual cannot have a
right that p be the case unless the individual is capable of
desiring that p be the case," it follows that a nonself-conscious
being with no desire for its own continued existence has no right
to life.[23] Hence, the unborn do not have a right to life. In any
event, the philosophical assumption behind both Mollenkott's and
Tooley's arguments, as well as the arguments of others such as
Warren and Rachels, is that only an entity that _functions_ in a
certain way (e.g., in the case of Tooley, "is capable of desiring
that p be the case") is a person with a full right to life (i.e.,
fully human). I maintain that this position has several flaws.
First, it does not seem to follow from the intermediate
conclusion (that an unborn human is not a person) that abortion is
always morally justified. Jane English has pointed out that
"non-persons do get some consideration in our moral code, though of
course they do not have the same rights as persons have (and in
general they do not have moral responsibilities), and though their
interests may be overridden by the interests of persons. Still, we
cannot just treat them in any way at all."[24]
English goes on to write that we consider it morally wrong to
torture beings that are nonpersons, such as dogs or birds, although
we do not say these beings have the same rights as persons. And
though she considers it problematic as to how we are to decide what
one may or may not do to nonpersons, she nevertheless draws the
conclusion that "if our moral rules allowed people to treat some
person-like non-persons in ways we do not want people to be
treated, this would undermine the system of sympathies and
attitudes that makes the ethical system work."[25]
Second, one can question why one must accept a _functional_
definition of personhood to exclude the unborn. It is not obvious
that functional definitions always succeed. For example, when the
Boston Celtics' Larry Bird is kissing his wife, does he cease to be
a basketball player because he is not functioning as one? Of course
not. He does not _become_ a basketball player when he functions as
a basketball player, but rather, he functions as a basketball
player because he _is_ a basketball player. Similarly, when a
person is asleep, unconscious, or temporarily comatose, or a
newborn, he (or she) is not functioning as a person as defined in
premise 2. Nevertheless, no reasonable person would say that this
individual is not a person while in this state.[26] Therefore,
since a person functions as a person because he _is_ a person and
is not a person because he _functions_ as a person, defining
personhood strictly in terms of function is inadequate.
Of course, the abortion-rights advocate may want to argue, as
was argued in the case of the sentience criterion, that the analogy
between sleeping/unconscious/comatose persons and the unborn breaks
down because the former _at one time_ in their existence functioned
as persons while the latter, the unborn, did not. Although this
point is worth noting, the abortion-rights advocate fails to grasp
the significant flaw in defining personhood strictly in terms of
function.
As I pointed out in my criticism of the sentience criterion, to
claim that a person can be functional, become nonfunctional, and
then return to a state of function is to assume that there is some
underlying personal unity to this individual that allows us to say
that the person who has returned to functional capacity is the
_same_ person who was functional prior to being in a nonfunctional
state. But this would mean that human function is a sufficient but
not a necessary condition for personhood. Consequently, it does not
make sense to say that a person comes into existence when human
function arises. Rather, it does make sense to say that a fully
human entity is a person who has the natural inherent capacity to
give rise to human functions. And since an unborn entity typically
has this natural inherent capacity, (he or) she is a person.
As John Jefferson Davis writes, "Our ability to have conscious
experiences and recollections arises out of our personhood; the
basic metaphysical reality of personhood precedes the unfolding of
the conscious abilities inherent in it."[27] Therefore, an ordinary
unborn human entity is a person, and hence, fully human. In other
words, because the unborn human is a person with a certain _natural
inherent_ capacity (i.e., her essence), she will _function_ as a
person in the near future, just as the reversibly comatose and the
temporarily unconscious will likewise do because of their natural
inherent capacity. The unborn are not potential persons but persons
with much potential.
Along the same lines, Ray has made the observation that the
view of human person as a natural "kind" which provides a ground
for certain functions, rather than as an emergence of certain
functions, is more consistent with our general moral intuitions.
For "the recognition of the rights of the young is less dependent
on their actual, current capacities than on their species and
potential [i.e., their natural inherent capacity]."
For example, no one doubts that day-old human children have
fewer actual capacities than day-old calves. Human infants, in
terms of environmental awareness, mobility, etc., are rather
unimpressive in comparison to the calves, especially if one
calculates their ages from conception. But this comparison does not
persuade us to believe that the calves have greater intrinsic worth
and an inherent right to life. For if human infants were sold to
butchers (let us suppose for the high market value of their body
parts) in the same way that farmers sell calves to humane butchers,
we would find such a practice deeply disturbing. Yet if intrinsic
worth is really contingent upon current capacities rather than
natural inherent capacity, we should have no problem with the
selling of human infants to butchers. But Ray points out why we do
find such a practice morally repugnant: "The wrongness would
consist not merely in ignoring the interest that society might have
in the children, but in violating the children's own rights. Yet if
those rights are grounded in current capacities alone, the calves
should enjoy at least the same moral status as the children, and
probably higher status." What follows is that "the difference in
status is plausibly explained... only with reference to the
children's humanity, their natural kind."[28]
*_THE GRADUALIST THESIS_*
Those who defend the gradualist thesis, such as Daniel Callahan
and Robert Wennberg,[29] argue that the unborn entity increases in
value as it develops physically. Unlike the theories critiqued
above, in this view there is no one decisive moment at which the
unborn entity moves from nonperson to person. For example, the
one-celled zygote has less value than the three-month fetus while
the three-month fetus has a lesser right-to-life than the
eight-month fetus.
There have been a number of critiques of this position which
space does not permit me to articulate here.[30] However, our
critique of the major decisive-moment theories in Parts Three and
Four of this series is sufficient to refute gradualism. That is to
say, since none of the decisive moments we have already gone over
can be shown to eradicate the full humanness of the unborn entity
at any stage of her development, it follows that there are no
philosophical, scientific, or moral grounds by which to say that
the unborn _gradually_ becomes fully human. For she would still
need to achieve full humanness at some decisive moment. That is,
someone who is fully human cannot gradually become _more_ fully
human. Certainly it is true that the unborn human _physically
develops gradually,_ as is true of humans at later stages (e.g.,
infancy, childhood, adolescence). But it does not follow from this
fact that the unborn human is any less human than the infant, the
child, or the adolescent. They are nonetheless fully human although
they are _gradually developing._
*_COMMON QUESTIONS_*
In my critique of the decisive moment theories, I dealt with a
number of objections to the pro-life position. However, there are
other common objections which should be answered. In this final
section, I will briefly respond to five common questions asked
about the pro-life position.
*_1. Why don't sperm and ova have a right to life since they
are also genetically human?_* Sperm and ova do not have a right to
life because they are not individual genetic human beings, but are
merely _parts_ of individual genetic human beings. They are only
genetically human insofar as they share the genetic codes of their
owners, but this is also true of their owners' other parts (e.g.,
hands, feet, kidneys, etc.). Sperm and ova cease to exist at
conception when the zygote, an individual genetic human being,
comes into existence.
*_2. Doesn't this view "absolutize" biological human life?_*
Not at all. Although the pro-life advocate believes that biological
human life is important, he or she certainly does not believe that
it is absolute. For biological human life without the natural
inherent capacity to function as a person is probably not fully
human. And it is questionable whether the taking of such a life or
the permitting of such a life to die can be classified as homicide.
For example, I do not think it is homicide to pull the plug on a
respirator that is biologically sustaining a brain-dead patient.
Such a patient's natural capacity for personal acts is simply not
present. Of course, other questions surrounding the problem of the
withdrawal of certain forms of health care are much more complex
and fall outside the scope of this series.[31] In any event, the
pro-life advocate does not absolutize biological human life and is
willing to apply his principles critically and to think
reflectively in morally challenging situations.
*_3. Aren't you absolutizing the unborn's right to life?_* No,
for there could be times at which abortion is justified. The
pro-lifer is fully cognizant of the fact that we live in a world in
which moral conflicts can occur. Take, for example, the case in
which it is highly likely that a woman's pregnancy will result in
her death, as with a tubal pregnancy. Because it is a greater good
that one human should live rather than two die, the pro-lifer
believes that in this case abortion is justified, since otherwise
both unborn _and_ mother would die. However, as I argued elsewhere
in this series, abortion is not justified by appeals to reasons
such as financial burden or the child's potential handicap, because
if the unborn entity is fully human, one must respect her life as
one respects the lives of those who are already born.
*_4. Wouldn't your position mean that some forms of artificial
birth control result in homicide?_* Yes. For example, forms of
birth control that result in the death of the conceptus, such as
the IUD and the "morning-after" pill (RU-486), would logically
entail homicide if the pro-life position is correct. However, not
every form of birth control results in the death of the conceptus.
For example, the condom, diaphragm, some forms of the Pill,
spermicides, and sterilization would not logically entail homicide
if the pro-life position is correct, for they merely _prevent_
conception.
This is why the pro-life advocate makes a distinction between
_contraception_ and _birth control._ Contraception literally means
"to prevent conception." Therefore, all contraception is a form of
birth control, since it prevents birth. But not all forms of birth
control are contraceptive, since some forms -- such as the ones
cited above -- prevent birth by killing the conceptus _after
conception._ Hence, the pro-life advocate as such finds no problem
with _contraception_ as a form of family planning.
*_5. Isn't it true that some zygotes do not have forty-six
chromosomes?_* Yes. Although the normal number of chromosomes is
46, some people are born with less (e.g., people with Turner's
syndrome have 45) and some people are born with more (e.g., people
with Down's syndrome have 47). But don't forget that my case for
the unborn's humanness does not rest necessarily on the number of
chromosomes an individual may have, but on the fact that the entity
in question has a _human genetic structure._ Consequently, a human
genetic structure can still subsist in an abnormal number of
chromosomes (genes are contained in the chromosomes within the
nuclei of a person's cells). That is to say, the Down's or Turner's
syndrome child with _human_ genes and an abnormal number of
chromosomes is no more nonhuman than a child with an abnormal
number of more obvious parts. For example, a person born with six
fingers is human, as is a person born with one arm or one leg.
*_SUMMING IT UP_*
In this four-part series I critiqued four basic types of
arguments that have been put forth in defense of both liberal and
moderate positions on abortion rights: (1) arguments from pity
(Parts One and Two); (2) arguments from tolerance (Part Two); (3)
_ad hominem_ arguments (Part Two); and (4) arguments from decisive
moments (Parts Three and Four). In the process of critiquing these
arguments I gave a defense of the pro-life position that full
humanness begins at conception (Parts Three and Four), which
included a detailed presentation of fetal development (Part Three).
Despite the number of arguments covered in this series, some
readers will be disappointed that I did not deal with some
theological arguments[32] or lesser known philosophical
arguments.[33] But since even a four-part series has its
limitations and since Justice Harry Blackmun (who wrote the
majority decision in _Roe v. Wade_ [1973]) has argued that the
morality of abortion is completely contingent on the full humanness
of the unborn,[34] what has been covered in this series is more
than sufficient. For this series has clearly established the
following conclusions: (1) the popular arguments for abortion
rights either beg the question as to the full humanness of the
unborn or ignore the question altogether; and (2) both sound
philosophical and scientific reasoning clearly establish the full
humanness of the unborn from the moment of conception.
*_NOTES_*
1 Baruch Brody, _Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life: A
Philosophical View_ (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1975).
2 _Ibid.,_ 102.
3 Andrew Varga, _The Main Issues in Bioethics,_ 2d ed. (New York:
Paulist Press, 1984), 61-62.
4 _Ibid.,_ 62.
5 Brody, 113-14.
6 A. Chadwick Ray, "Humanity, Personhood, and Abortion,"
_International Philosophical Quarterly_ 25 (1985):238.
7 _Ibid._
8 _Ibid._
9 Varga, 62-63.
10 _Ibid.,_ 63.
11 Jane English, "Abortion and the Concept of a Person," in
_Biomedical Ethics,_ ed. Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S. Zembatty
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), 430.
12 _Webster v. Reproductive Health Services_ (1989) in _United
States Law Week_ 57 (July 1989):5040.
13 For a defense of this view, _see_ Richard Werner, "Abortion: The
Practice_ 3 (1974):201-22.
14 _See_ Joel Feinberg, "Grounds For Coercion," in _Ethical Theory
and Social Issues,_ ed. David Theo Goldberg (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1989), 307-15.
15 Ray, 240.
16 Peter Kreeft, "Human Personhood Begins at Conception," in
_Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine_ 4 (Winter 1990):11.
17 Michael Tooley, _Abortion and Infanticide_ (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1983).
in _Biomedical Ethics,_ 417-23.
19 James Rachels, _The End of Life_ (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1986). For a critical analysis of this book, _see_ J. P.
Moreland's review in _The Thomist_ 53 (Oct. 1989):714-22.
20 Virginia Ramey Mollenkott, "Reproducive Choice: Basic to Justice
for Women," _Christian Scholar's Review_ 17 (March 1988):286-93.
21 _See_ Tooley.
22 Mollenkott, 291.
23 Tooley, 167. In rebuttal, _see_ David Clark, "An Evaluation of
the Quality of Life Argument for Infanticide," _Simon Greenleaf
Law Review_ 5 (1985-86):104-8; and Richard A. McCormick, S.J.,
_How Brave a New World? Dilemmas in Bioethics_ (Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 1981), 157-59.
24 English, 429.
25 _Ibid.,_ 430.
26 Some philosophers, such as Tooley (_Abortion & Infanticide_),
"bite the bullet" and say that infanticide is not a form of
murder since the newborn is not a person.
27 John Jefferson Davis, _Abortion and the Christian_
(Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co.,
1984), 57.
28 Ray, 240-41.
29 Daniel Callahan, _Abortion: Law, Choice, and Morality_ (New
York: Macmillan, 1970); and Robert Wennberg, _Life in the
Balance: Exploring the Abortion Controversy_ (Grand Rapids, MI:
Williams B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1985).
30 Philip Devine, _The Ethics of Homicide_ (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1979); Robert E. Joyce, "Personhood and the
Conception Event," _The New Scholasticism_ 52 (Winter
1978):104-9; J. P. Moreland and Norman L. Geisler, _The Life and
Death Debate: Moral Issues of Our Time_ (Westport, CT: Praeger
Books, 1990), 31-34.
31 _See_ Moreland and Geisler, _The Life and Death Debate;_ and
Francis J. Beckwith and Norman L. Geisler, _Matters of Life and
Death: Calm Answers to Tough Questions about Abortion and
Euthanasia_ (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1991), part 2.
32 _See_ my "A Critical Appraisal of the Theological Arguments for
Abortion Rights," _Bibliotheca Sacra_ (July/September 1991).
33 Judith Jarvis Thomson, for example, argues that abortion is
morally justified even _if_ the unborn are fully human. I
critique this argument in "Personal Bodily Rights, Abortion, and
Unplugging the Violinist: A Critical Analysis," _International
Philosophical Quarterly_ (March 1992) (forthcoming).
34 Justice Harry Blackmun, in "The 1973 Supreme Court Decisions on
State Abortion Laws: Excerpts from Opinion in Roe v. Wade," in
_The Problem of Abortion,_ 2d ed., ed. Joel Feinberg (Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth, 1984), 195.
-------------
End of document, CRJ0141A.TXT (original CRI file name),
"Answering The Arguments For Abortion Rights. Part Four: When
Does a Human Become a Person?"
release A, August 31, 1994
R. Poll, CRI
(A special note of thanks to Bob and Pat Hunter for their help in
the preparation of this ASCII file for BBS circulation.)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Christian Research Journal is published quarterly by the
Christian Research Institute (CRI) -- founded in 1960 by the late
Dr. Walter R. Martin. While CRI is concerned with and involved
in the general defense of the faith, our area of research
specialization is limited to elements within the modern religious
scene that compete with, assault, or undermine biblical
Christianity. These include cults (that is, groups which deny
essential Christian doctrines such as the deity of Christ and the
Trinity); the occult, much of which has become focused in the
contemporary New Age movement; the major world religions; and
aberrant Christian teachings (that is, teachings which compromise
or confuse essential biblical truth).
Regular features of the Journal include "Newswatch," witnessing
tips and book reviews.
CHRISTIAN RESEARCH JOURNAL RATES: (subject to change)
One Year Two Years
U.S. Residents [ ] 20.00 [ ] 37.00
Canadian (U.S. funds) [ ] 24.00 [ ] 44.00
Other Foreign (U.S. funds) [ ] 36.00 [ ] 66.00
Please make checks payable to CRI
To place a credit card order by phone, call us toll-free at:
(800) 2-JOURNAL
To subscribe to the Christian Research Journal, please print this
coupon, fill in the necessary information and mail it with your
payment to:
CRI, P.O. Box 500-TC, San Juan Capistrano, CA 92693-0500
[ ] Yes! I want to subscribe to the Christian Research Journal.
Name: ___________________________________________________
Address: ___________________________________________________
Address: ___________________________________________________
City, State, ZIP: __________________________________________
Country: _______________ Phone: ____________________________
------------------
YOURS FOR THE ASKING
Did you know that CRI has a wealth of information on various
topics that is yours for the asking? In fact, a free
subscription to the Christian Research Newsletter is yours if you
contact CRI and ask for one saying that you found out about the
offer from this computer text file. We offer a wide variety of
articles and fact sheets free of charge. Write us today for
information on these or other topics. Our first-rate research
staff will do everything possible to help you.
Christian Research Institute
P.O. Box 500-TC
San Juan Capistrano, CA 92693
(714) 855-9926
---------------
End of file.